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A side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enables 
Mexico to ship more duty-free sugar to the United States than under the pre-1994 restrictive 
country-specific, tariff-rate quota (TRQ) policy. However, U.S. and Mexican negotiators 
disagree over the issue of exactly how much sugar Mexico can actually export to the U.S. 
under the NAFTA side agreement. Their disagreement focuses on which version of the 
NAFTA side agreement governs this issue. The U.S. argues that a 1993 side letter limits 
Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. to 250,000 MT of Mexico’s net surplus production. In 
contrast, Mexico insists that its version of the side letter does not take into account the 
consumption of HFCS as part of the net surplus formula, and does not limit exports to 
250,000 MT. This study focuses on the U.S. interpretation of side letter. 
A multi-region, open economy Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model was used 
to simulate impacts of increased Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. Results indicate that as a 
result of U.S. sugar TRQ liberalization under NAFTA, U.S. producers will lose; processors 
and consumers will gain due to lower sugar prices. In the Mexican side, sugar 
producers/exporters will capitalize on higher U.S. sugar prices, while local consumers are 
likely to lose, due to slightly higher prices and reduced domestic supply. U.S. producer surplus 
decreased by $7.5million, U.S. consumers gained $8.5 million in surplus, while U.S. 
government will have to spend $29.2 million to support domestic producers authorized in 
sugar program. 
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U.S. Sugar Policies 
No nation was ever ruined by trade. 
         Benjamin Franklin 
Governments of sugar producing countries often interfere in their sweetener sector to 
protect their domestic producers and processors from volatile world sugar prices. Supply 
swings can impact producer prices, and consumer welfare. Historically, the United States has 
never been able to satisfy domestic demand, and thus it continues to be a net sugar importer 
even though the U.S. offers price protection to its producers. Starting in the 1930s, the United 
States has supported its sugar producers by insolating the domestic sugar market from world 
market forces of supply and demand.  
The Sugar Acts of 1934, 1937, and 1948 required the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), based on production forecasts, to allocate sugar quotas among U.S. growers and 
foreign countries, make authorized payments to producers when needed as a motivation to 
limit production, and to impose excise taxes on refined and processed sugar in the U.S. These 
policies were in force until 1974, when the U.S. offered relatively free trade to foreign sugar 
producers for a few years. Congress reintroduced mandatory price supports in 1977 and 1978, 
discretionary support in 1979, and included mandatory price support programs for domestic 
sugar in the Agricultural and Food Act of 1981 and the Food Security Act of 1985. 
Subsequently, the 1990 farm program, the 1993 Budget Reconciliation Act and the 1996 Farm 
Bill extended sugar program authority through FY2003 crop year (Jurenas, 2000). 
The current sugar program, authorized through FY2003 by the Omnibus Farm Act (P. 
L. 104-127), better known as the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
(FAIR Act of 1996), is designed to protect domestic sugarcane, sugar beet growers, and 
processors. The USDA accomplishes this by providing loans at minimum price levels to sugar  
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processors and by restricting sugar imports. The FY2001 loan rates are set at 18 cents/lb. for 
raw cane sugar, and 22.9 cents/lb. for refined beet sugar (Jurenas, 2000, p.4). The current 
sugar policy makes sure that the foreign sugar enters into the U.S. only to balance domestic 
demand, and results in a market price above the support level, which allows processors to pay 
off their support loans (Jurenas, 2000).  
Mexican Sugar 
Under the terms of the NAFTA agreement, beginning October 1, 2000, Mexico 
received the right to ship up to 250,000 metric tons of its net production surplus sugar each year 
to the United States. Previous Mexican sugar quotas were much lower at 25,000 metric tons 
per year (Haley, 2000). The amount of Mexican exports depends on the efficiency of Mexican 
sugar mills. The previous Mexican government, led by the long-ruling Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), used public funds to subsidize the country’s inefficient cane 
growers and refiners, thus turning the sugar industry into a rural vote-buying mechanism 
(Fritsch, 2000). The government dictated the price that the mills must pay for sugar cane and 
other inputs while keeping refined sugar price low for consumers. In the late 1980s, when the 
PRI began free market-oriented reforms, the government lost most of its control over 
businesses, but they were able to retain control of prices in the sugar industry and prevent 
extensive tinkering with the PRI’s politically sensitive social compacts. At the same time, U.S. 
exports of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) under NAFTA replaced sugar in the Mexican 
soft drink manufacturing industry, thus increasing Mexico’s sugar surplus (Fritsch, 2000). 
A side agreement to NAFTA enables Mexico to ship much more duty-free sugar to 
the United States than under the pre-1994 tariff-rate quota (TRQ) policy. But U.S. and 
Mexican negotiators disagree over the issue of exactly how much sugar Mexico can actually  
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export to U.S. under the NAFTA side agreement. Disagreement focuses on which version of 
the NAFTA side agreement governs the issue. The U.S. argues that a 1993 side letter limits 
Mexican sugar exports to 250,000 MT each year through 2008. In contrast, Mexico insists it is 
entitled to ship all of its net surplus sugar, currently 600,000 MT, to the United States. 
Consequently, Mexico has asked for a dispute-settlement panel to resolve the question under 
NAFTA (Jurenas, 2000).  
Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: (1) to analyze how the wider market access for 
Mexican sugar under the NAFTA side agreement impacts U.S. producer and consumer 
welfare, and (2) to discuss the political economy of wider access of Mexican sugar to the U.S. 
market. A TRQ liberalization scenario will be analyzed, depending upon the policy framework 
for handling the excess amount of sugar in the U.S. market. Particularly, the study will analyze 
the estimated welfare impact of additional Mexican sugar on the U.S. market, particularly 
changes in consumer and producer surpluses. In addition the U.S. government cost to store 
the excess sugar in order to support sugar prices under current sugar program will be 
discussed.  
Political Economy of Sugar Policies 
In recent years, economists have explained the origination of trade policies, in general 
and for protectionism in particular, in terms of the welfare interests of those who benefit from 
protection and those who lose. These models claim that legislators are restrained from yielding 
to demands for protection only by the opposing political demands of those who stand to lose 
the protection. The lawmakers act as intermediaries between those who seek protectionism  
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and the anti-protectionism interests of consumer advocates. The small but very strong groups 
of producers, who stand to gain a great deal from protection, have a strong incentive to lobby 
the government in order to adopt appropriate protectionism legislation. On the other hand, 
the consumers, who will most likely lose from protectionism policies, are not likely to organize 
effective resistance against protectionist legislation. For example, in the United States, the 
sugar policy increases individual expenditures by only a few dollars per person per year, while 
the sugar quota generates more than $600 million for a few thousand sugar producers in the 
United States (Salvatore, 1993, p. 325).  
The U.S. sugar program is one of the classical case studies for analyzing the political 
economy of agricultural policy making. Starting in 1789, the government of the United States 
intervened in the sugar industry by setting foreign and domestic quotas for imports and 
production, thus determining domestic sugar prices. As a result of U.S. intervention policies, 
sugar prices in the United States were historically higher than in the rest of the world. Starting 
in the late 1980s, U.S. sugar policies faced several challenges. The most significant impact was 
the development and adoption of sugar substitutes, such as high fructose corn syrup, which 
forced the U.S. government to adopt more restrictive import policies, reducing the import 
quotas by about 41% during the 1986-1987 period (Lopez, 1989).  
The current U.S. tariff rate quotas (TRQ) originated in 1982 under the Presidential 
Proclamation No. 4941 of May 5, 1982. The new, country-by-country sugar quotas replaced 
the previous absolute quota system. Under the new regulations, the U. S. Trade 
Representatives Office (USTR) has the responsibility of making all sugar trade announcements 
and determinations concerning quota allocations to individual countries. Under the same 
Proclamation, the Secretary of Agriculture determines sugar quota periods and global quota 
amounts (Suarez, 1997).  
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Starting October 1, 1990, the United States replaced the old absolute quota system 
with a TRQ system. The new system established a limited amount of imports allowed to enter 
the United States under a low (first tier) tariff; any imports beyond that level are assessed a 
high (second tier) tariff, which is practically a prohibitive rate. The country allocation system 
remained the same. The U.S. uses the country-by-country allocation system for raw sugar cane 
imports only. Since FY1996 a new globalized, first come, first serve, system decreased the 
country-by-country allocations for the refined sugar TRQ. The specialty sugar TRQs were also 
globalized instead of establishing specific quotas for 23 countries. Beginning FY1998, under 
the terms of NAFTA, Canada and Mexico received individual allocations of refined sugar 
TRQs (Suarez, 1997). 
Each year the U.S. Trade Representatives Office announces country-by-country TRQ 
allocations for raw cane sugar, refined sugar, and sugar containing products. The TRQ for raw 
cane sugar for Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 is 1,117,195 metric tons raw value. The minimum TRQ 
levels under the GATT Uruguay Round are allocated to forty countries. The list of countries 
and respective allocations are reported in the Table 1. The United States uses historical trade 
volumes to make yearly allocations. 
Under NAFTA, a TRQ for 10,300 metric tons raw value is allocated to Canada, 2,954 
metric tons raw value is allocated to Mexico. Under the NAFTA side agreement, USTR 
allocated an additional quantity of 105,788 metric tons raw value to Mexico. The remaining 
38,000 metric tons raw value of refined sugar and 17,656 metric tons raw value reserved for 
specialty sugars will be allocated on a first-come, first-serve basis. A tariff-rate quota quantity 
of sugar containing products of 59,250 metric tons is allocated to Canada under the U.S.-
Canadian free trade agreement. The remaining TRQ is available for other countries (Daly et 
al., 2000).  
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Table 1. U.S. Sugar Tariff Rate Quota, 2000/01 Allocations, Metric Tons Raw Value 
Country Quota  Allocation 









Cote d’Ivoire  7,258 
Costa Rica  15,797 
Dominican Republic  185,346 
Ecuador 11,584 




















South Africa  24,221 




Trinidad & Tobago  7,372 
Uruguay 7,258 
Zimbabwe 12,637 
Subtotal Raw cane sugar 2/ 1,117,195 
Refined Sugars   
Mexico (NAFTA)  105,788 
Mexico (Sept. 1997 - 2001 allocation)  2,954 
Canada (1997 - 2001)  10,300 
Specialty sugar 3/ 17,656 
Other refined sugars 3/ 7,090 
Subtotal refined sugars  143,788 
Grand Total  1,260,983 
1/ Mexico’s NAFTA allocation may be shipped either raw or refined, 2/ TRQ total may not add due to 
rounding, 3/ are on first-come-first-serve basis.  
 
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA, SSS-231.   
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The FAIR Act of 1996 left the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) of the United 
States unaffected as amended by the Presidential Proclamation to implement the GATT 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. The HTS gave the Secretary of Agriculture an 
authorization to limit the quantity of sugar imported at the lower of two alternative duty rates. 
The sugar TRQ system is very critical in setting the import levels, thus restricting the supply of 
sugar in the U.S. market and thereby supporting the U.S. sugar price (Lord, 1995).  
NAFTA Provisions For Sugar Trade 
The original NAFTA provisions for sugar were heavily opposed by the U.S. sugar 
industry. The reason for this opposition was the fact that increased exports of HFCS to 
Mexico would substitute for Mexican sugar, thus creating a huge amount of sugar surplus in 
Mexico to be exported to U.S. under NAFTA. In order to pass the Agreement in the U.S. 
Congress, U.S. and Mexican governments developed a side-letter to the original NAFTA 
agreement changing the original NAFTA provisions for U.S.-Mexico bilateral sugar trade. 
Since then, there has been a major trade dispute between U.S. and Mexico on the content and 
validity of the side-letter agreement.  
The original provisions of NAFTA agreement limited Mexican sugar exports for the 
15-year (1994-2009) NAFTA transition period to no more than Mexico’s projected net 
production surplus, but not less than 7,258 MTRV of duty free sugar. For the first six years, duty 
free access was limited to 25,000 MTRV. In year seven, Mexico would receive the right to ship 
as much as 150,000 MTRV, and each subsequent year Mexico’s duty-free access would 
increase by 10 percent. If Mexico achieved net production surplus status for two consecutive 
years, it could exceed the maximum amount.  
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The introduction of a side-letter changed the major provisions of the NAFTA 
agreement. In the revised agreement, the net surplus was calculated by taking into account both 
sugar and HFCS on the consumption side, which lowers the actual net surplus amount. In 
addition, the side-letter specified the annual maximum amount of exports to 250,000 MTRV 
for 2001-07 periods. This put an upper cap on Mexican unlimited duty-free access to U.S. 
market in case Mexico achieves net producer surplus status for two consecutive years. Currently, 
the Mexican government argues that its version of the side-agreement does not count HFCS 
consumption in the formula and does not limit exports to 250,000 MTRV during 2001-07 
periods.  
Under the NAFTA agreement, during the 15-year transition period, Mexico is subject 
to a high-tier tariff rate (low-tier tariff rate equals to zero). But this tariff rate will be gradually 
decreased during the 15-year transition period, reaching zero in year 2008. After this point, 
Mexico will be allowed to export unlimited amounts of sugar duty free to the U.S. The U.S. 
high-tier tariff scheme for raw cane and refined sugar is reported in Table 2 (Haley 1999). 
Introduction to GTAP and GEMPACK 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) introduced tariff rate quotas 
(TRQ) as a preferred new policy mechanism, ensuring both protections for domestic 
producers and market access for imports. TRQs convert operating non-tariff barriers such as 
restrictive quotas into tariffs. Tariff rate quotas have become the most commonly used 
mechanism to control the trade of agricultural commodities. A large number of TRQs are 
country specific and, most of the time includes politically sensitive commodities such as sugar.  
TRQ administration is very important in agricultural trade and market access 
negotiations. In the current tendency towards globalization and market integration, the need   
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Table 2. U.S. High-Tier Tariffs for Sugar Imports from ROW and Mexico 
High-tier tariff (cents per pound) 
Rest of World (ROW)  Mexico 
 
Raw cane sugar  Refined sugar  Raw cane sugar  Refined sugar 
Base 18.08 19.08 16.00  16.95 
1995 17.62 18.60 15.20  16.11 
1996 17.17 18.12 14.80  15.69 
1997 16.72 17.65 14.40  15.26 
1998 16.27 17.17 14.00  14.84 
1999 15.82 16.69 13.60  14.42 
2000 15.36 16.21 12.09  12.81 
2001 15.36 16.21 10.58  11.21 
2002 15.36 16.21  9.07 9.61 
2003 15.36 16.21  7.56 8.01 
2004 15.36 16.21  6.04 6.41 
2005 15.36 16.21  4.53 4.81 
2006 15.36 16.21  3.02 3.20 
2007 15.36 16.21  1.51 1.60 
2008 15.36 16.21  0.00 0.00 










for quantitative analysis of policy issues on a global basis becomes critical. After the GATT 
Uruguay Round, the interest in estimating the impact of the Agreement and related bilateral 
and multilateral policies on individual countries or regions, international trade, and world 
welfare increased.  
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) was founded in 1992 at Purdue 
University. The aim of the project is to decrease the cost and efforts of quantitative analysis in 
international economic issues in an economy-wide framework. GTAP is a fully documented, 
publicly available standard modeling framework. 
The GTAP database covers almost all major regions and commodities in the world 
trade. The database contains bilateral trade, transportation, and protection data characterizing 
economic linkages among regions, together with individual country input-output databases 
that account for inter-sectoral linkages within each region. The GTAP database is subject to 
annual upgrades to ensure consistency and provide current information (Hertel 1998). 
The authors of GTAP model developed a standard modeling framework to operate 
the large database with more efficiency. The standard GTAP model is a multi-region, 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, with perfect competition and constant returns 
to scale. Bilateral trade is handled via the Armington assumption. The Armington approach to 
modeling import demand was proposed by Paul Armington in 1969. The approach assumes 
that imported intermediates are separate from domestic intermediate inputs, i.e. firms 
determine the optimal mix of imported and domestic goods based on the information 
available on imports in the form of source and price. Although the Armington approach has 
often been criticized, it is common in trade modeling because it accommodates cross hauling 
of similar goods and tracking bilateral trade flows (Hertel 1998, p. 41). The theory of GTAP  
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multi-region, applied general equilibrium model is fully and detailed discussed by Hertel 
(1998). 
The GTAP model is implemented using Release 6.0 of GEMPACK software. 
GEMPACK is a suite of general-purpose economic modeling software. It is designed 
primarily for general and partial equilibrium models. It is used by over 300 organizations in 
more than 50 countries. The main characteristic of the software is that it provides a powerful 
tool in solving large systems of non-linear equations. Upon specification of the model 
equations using algebra-like notations, modelers are free from computing details of the 
solution process.   
GEMPACK is established at the Center of Policy Studies (CoPS) at Monash 
University, Australia. GEMPACK is well documented. Details and extensive documentation is 
possible to find at the GEMPACK website (www.monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm). 
More extensive and detailed explanations of GTAP and GEMPACK can be found in the 
GTAP manual (Hertel 1998) and Technical Paper No. 18 by Elbehri and Pearson (2000). 
U.S. Sugar Policy Liberalization Towards Mexico Under Terms of the NAFTA 
The analysis in this research is based on a previous study conducted by Elbehri and 
Pearson (2000). They have developed a TRQ model within a general equilibrium multi-
regional context. Their model allows for bilateral tariff rate quotas and can handle binding 
prices and quantity constraints as well as quota rent reallocations. Also it provides a 
comprehensive tool for analyzing interactions with other aspects of multilateral and bilateral 
trade agreements. Their model is completely documented in Technical Paper No. 18, which 
serves as a reference for this research. With the technical paper, the authors provided a ZIP  
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format file containing a package of software and files for carrying out TRQ applications with 
GTAP.  
To meet the objectives of this research, this study differs from the one conducted by 
Elbehri and Pearson in the following areas: different sets of commodities and country 
aggregations are used, different closure specifications are used, different shock levels based on 
the NAFTA provisions are utilized, and several modifications in input files for consistency are 
implemented. 
Data 
The study uses the Version 4 GTAP database for the analysis. The database contains 
detailed bilateral trade, transportation and protection data characterizing economic linkages 
among regions, linked together with individual country input-output databases, which account 
for inter-sectoral linkages among 50 sectors within each of 45 regions. All monetary values of 
the data are in $US millions and the base year for Version 4 is 1995.  
The source of GTAP trade data is the United Nations (UN) D-series trade statistics. 
Statistical database is registered and maintained by UN statistical Office under the name 
COMTRADE, which stands for COMmodity TRADE. This database is one of the most 
complete and comprehensive databases in existence in terms of commodity and country 
coverage. The Economic Research Service of USDA assisted in filling the missing data and 
estimates in the COMTRADE database. A detailed overview of GTAP database and data 
sources is found in GTAP manual (Hertel 1998).  
The policy analysis starts with the aggregation of the standard GTAP database. The 
aggregation is done in two directions – commodity and country aggregation. The TRQ 
applications in the thesis are based on a 4-commodity, 6-region aggregation of version 4 of the  
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GTAP data. The commodity side of the aggregation involves four commodity groups: sugar, 
other agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Regional aggregation has six regions: U.S., EU, 
Asia, Latin America (excluding Mexico), Mexico, and Rest of World. The commodities and 
countries in the aggregated groups are listed in Table 3.   
This analysis uses files and software programs supplied with Technical Paper No. 18. 
Standard GTAP data files are replaced by those created using GTAPAgg software. Extra    
data files required in addition to standard GTAP data files for TRQ applications are modified 
manually. 
Policy Application: U.S. Sugar Policy Liberalization under NAFTA 
The analysis simulates the U.S. view of scheduled changes in U.S. TRQ provisions for 
Mexican sugar imports for the 2000/01 marketing year. Under the U.S. interpretation of 
NAFTA provisions and a side letter on sugar, changes in TRQ rules for Mexican sugar 
imports for 2000/01 are as follows: 
1.  The Mexican sugar TRQ is increased from 25,000 MT to the lower of a) 
Mexico’s net production surplus or b) 250,000 MT. 
2.  The over quota tariff rate for Mexican sugar is decreased from 16.11 cents per 
pound to 11.21 cents per pound. 
USDA calculated that Mexico’s net production surplus for 2000/01 was 105,788 MT and 
set Mexico’s TRQ at that level for 2000/01 (USDA, SSS-231, p. 62). Mexico disputes both the 
formula used to calculate net surplus production and the 250,000 MT TRQ limit claimed by 
the U.S. and argues that they should be permitted to export 600,000 MT of sugar into the U.S. 




Table 3. Regional and Commodity Aggregation 
 
Regional Aggregation  Commodity Aggregation 
1. United States (USA) 
 
2. European Union (E_U) 
 
3. Asia (ASI) 
 
4. Latin America (LAM) 
  All of Latin America except 
 Mexico 
 
5. Mexico (MEX) 
 
6. Rest of World (ROW) 
 
1. Sugar (Sugar) 
  Sugar cane; sugar beet 
 Sugar 
 
2. Other primary production (Athag) 
  Paddy rice; Wheat; 
  Cereal grains nec; 
  Vegetables, fruits, nuts; 
  Oils seeds; plant-based fibers; 
  Crops nec; raw milk; forestry; 
  Cattle, sheep and goats, horses; 
  Coal; gas; Oil; Minerals nec; 
  Dairy products; Food products         
            nec; Beverages and tobacco           
            products; Animal products; Wool,   
            silk-worm cocoons; Fishing;   
            Bovine cattle,   sheep and goat,   
            horse meat products; Meat  
            products nec; Vegetable oils and  
            fats; Processed rice; 
 
3. Shoe polish and other manufact (Mnfcs) 
  Textiles; Wearing apparel; leather 
  products; Wood products; paper 
  products; Petroleum, coal products; 
  Chemical, rubber, plastic products; 
  Mineral products; Metals nec; 
  Metal products; Motor vehicles and 
  parts; Transport equipment nec; 
  Electronic equipment; Machinery 
  and equipment nec; Manufactures; 
 
4. Services and activities NES (Svces) 
  Electricity; Gas manufacture, 
  distribution; water; Construction; 
  Trade, transport; Financial,   business, 
recreational services; 
  Public admin and defense, 






Before beginning the actual TRQ policy simulation, a production/output increase for 
Mexico is simulated to normalize the base data up to the 2000 level. This was accomplished by 
imposing a 32% shock on Mexican sugar output p_qo(“sugar”,“MEX”).  
The standard GTAP assumes that all the rent accrues to the importing region. The 
U.S. gives the sugar exporters the right to control exports by allocating the quotas to the 
governments of individual countries (Skully 1998, p. 17). Because the government of 
exporting country has the right to allocate the export licenses among its producers and 
exporters, it receives all the rents associated with the quota allocation. This is the reason that 
in this research all of the quota rent is allocated to the exporting regions. Before proceeding to 
the TRQ liberalization application, the quota rent from the U.S. sugar TRQ was reallocated 
from the U.S. to the exporting countries. Updated logical GTAPDATA, TRQDATA, and 
QRSHAREX data files were used as a starting point for TRQ policy liberalization application.  
TRQ Policy Liberalization Application in GTAP 
This scenario assumes an increase in the Mexican TRQ from 25,000 MT to 105,788 
MT and a decrease in the high-tier tariff rate from 16.11 cents per pound to 11.21 cents per 
pound. This scenario was simulated using the standard closure specifications. Shocks in the 
amount of 323% for the U.S./Mexican sugar import quota increase and 30.42% for over-
quota tariff cut for Mexican sugar exports were simulated.  
As a result of simulation, Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. increased by the full 323% 
allowed. Considering the change and the fact that Mexico exports cane sugar, increased 
exports in dollar terms are $32 million ([105,788 MT-25,000 MT]*2204*0.18). This was 
according to our expectations, since Mexican producers would prefer to export their sugar to 
a higher priced market. Because Mexico ships more sugar to the U.S. market, its exports to  
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other regions decline. Due to the increased exports at preferential prices, sugar prices in 
Mexico increased by 0.59%. Because the excess sugar was allowed directly into the market, 
U.S. sugar prices fell by 0.20%. In response to lower priced imports, U.S. sugar producers cut 
production by 0.62%. Applying the GTAP percentage change of U.S. sugar price and 
production to the U.S. production data obtained from Economic Research Service (ERS) 
(USDA, SSS-231, p. 54) and the weighted average sugar price ($0.206/lb.) calculated using 
cane and beet support loan rates of $0.18/lb. and $0.229/lb., respectively, 0.62% change in 
U.S. sugar production accounts for 50,852 MT or $23.2 million decrease in total U.S. sugar 
production. The 323% increase in U.S. sugar imports from Mexico may seem a large number, 
but compared to the total U.S. production of 7,775,480 MT in 2000/01 (USDA, SSS-231, p. 
54), 0.62% decline in production due to the Mexican imports appear reasonable. Encouraged 
by preferential access to U.S. market, Mexican producers increase sugar output by 3.45% 
compared to the base simulation. It appears that sugar imports displace U.S. production in 
this scenario. 
Due to the absence of low-tier tariffs on Mexican sugar export to the U.S., and the 
fact that Mexican exports are not over-quota, there is no tariff revenue for the U.S. collected 
on Mexican sugar imports. Increased TRQ for Mexican exports decreased Mexican sugar 
quota rents by $7.69 million. This is explained by decrease in second-tier tariff rate. As a result 
of policy, the net social welfare effect shows a net gain for U.S. of $31.37 million. The net 
social welfare gain for U.S. can be mostly attributable to the reallocation of production 
resources from U.S. sugar producers to more efficient users and gains in consumer surplus 
due to the lower sugar prices.  
The changes of this policy liberalization are shown in dashed lines in Figure 1. The 
loss in producer surplus is represented by the area a above P
’



























Figure 1. Welfare Aspects of Import Quotas in Competitive Environment 
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due to the resource transfers from less efficient sectors to more efficient ones is represented 
by area b above P
’
US and below PUS, and gains in consumer surplus is represented by areas a 
through d above P
’
US and below PUS in Figure 1. U.S. sugar price and production percentage 
changes reported in GTAP were applied to the production volumes posted by ERS and U.S. 
sugar support loan rates to estimate the effects of policy liberalization on U.S. consumer and 
producer surplus, and efficiency changes. The estimation assumes linear supply and demand 
curves. The price change of 0.20% applied to the weighted average price of sugar ($0.206/lb.) 
obtained from ERS yields only a change of $0.0004/lb. 
Estimation yields a gain in U.S. consumer surplus of $8.5 million (areas a, b, c, d), an 
efficiency gain of $23,196 (area b) attributable to the transfers of production resources from 
sugar sector to more efficient sectors, and a loss in producer surplus of $7.5 million (area a) 
due to decreased production at lower prices.  
As a result of U.S. sugar TRQ liberalization under NAFTA, U.S. producers will lose, 
U.S. processors and consumers will gain, due to lower sugar prices. On the Mexican side, 
sugar producers/exporters will capitalize on higher U.S. sugar prices, while Mexican 
consumers are likely to lose, due to slightly higher prices and reduced domestic supply. 
The Cost of Government Support 
The U.S. government supports its sugar industry through fixed loan rates authorized 
by the sugar program. In order to keep its program in effect the U.S. government sometimes 
intervenes by purchasing sugar to reduce sugar supply in the U.S. A recent intervention was in 
mid-May 2000 when the USDA purchased some of the domestic sugar to restore the market 
price and supply. U.S. cannot further reduce market access provided to other countries under 
the commitments of WTO. If the USDA decides to utilize its authority to support U.S. sugar 
producers according to the provisions of the sugar program, it will have to purchase the  
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additional Mexican sugar, in which case the excess imports will not affect the market 
equilibrium. The cost to the federal government, same as to the taxpayers, will be the dollar 
amount of the purchased and stored sugar less revenue generated from disposal, if any. The 
calculations show that the USDA will have to spend about $29.2 million ([105,788 MT - 
25,000 MT] x $0.18/lb.) to purchase the additional Mexican sugar, assuming that Mexico 
exports only cane sugar. Taking into consideration the welfare impacts of the TRQ change on 
consumer and producer surpluses (positive $8.5 million and negative $7.5 million, 
respectively) and the amount U.S. government would need to spend to avoid these effects by 
purchasing the increased imports of Mexican sugar ($29.2 million), it is obvious that U.S. will 
be better off without any intervention. 
Summary and Implications 
           Trade theory suggests that if the U.S. liberalizes its sugar policy by giving wider access 
to Mexico, domestic producers are most likely to lose their market share, and domestic 
consumers and processors are likely to gain because more low cost sugar enters the market 
causing the U.S. market price to decline. The overall welfare change depends on the scope of 
producer and consumer welfare changes. 
The policy liberalization towards Mexico simulated in this study utilized the work 
conducted by Elbehri and Pearson (2000). Those authors developed a general equilibrium, 
multi-region TRQ model within GTAP. Several modifications to the model were conducted 
to suit the objectives of this research. Country and commodity aggregation was done using 
GTAPAgg software. Extra TRQ data files were manually modified to meet the objectives of 
the research. The entire simulation involved five separate steps, which were automated in a 
TRQmate program.  
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The policy liberalization increases Mexican sugar imports by the full 323% allowed, or 
$32 million, replacing Mexican exports to other regions. Supply decline in the Mexico 
increases domestic sugar prices by 0.59%. Increased sugar supply in the U.S. forced sugar 
prices in U.S. to decline by 0.20%. As a result of increased supply and lower domestic prices, 
U.S. sugar producers cut their sugar output by 0.62%, or $23.2 million. Preferential rights on 
market access give incentives to Mexican sugar producers to increase their sugar production. 
The simulation showed sugar output increase in Mexico by 3.45%. The net social welfare 
effect shows a net gain for U.S. of $31.37 million, which can be explained by gains in U.S. 
consumer surplus as a result of lower prices and by transferring the U.S. production resources 
from sugar production to more efficient sectors. U.S. producer surplus decreased by $7.5 
million, while U.S. consumers gained $8.5 million in surplus. To eliminate such changes in the 
domestic market, the U.S. government would have to spend about $29.2 million (authorized 
in FAIR Act of 1996) to purchase the additional Mexican sugar. It is clear that government 
intervention will cost U.S. taxpayers much more. 
Although current simulation results show small changes in percentage terms, these can 
be explained by the fact that 105,788 MT might be a large number for the Mexican side, but in 
the U.S. it accounts for an insignificant portion of the sugar market. The most significant 
NAFTA impact will accrue when Mexico becomes eligible to ship all of its sugar without a 
constraint to trade, which will occur after the 15-year transition period is phased out in 2009. 
Currently, Mexico claims that it has at least 600,000 MT sugar ready to be exported. USDA 
forecasts that by 2003 HFCS will account for 75% of the sweeteners used in soft drinks, and 
30% in food processing. Taking into account such sharp reductions in sugar demand in 
Mexico, USDA projects Mexico’s sugar export potential in 2009 to range from 1,000,000 MT 
to 2,200,000 MT (Haley, 2000).  
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Larger amounts can be a direct threat to the security of the U.S. sugar industry. It will 
result in the loss of U.S. producer surplus and U.S. consumer and Mexican exporter surplus 
gain. At that point, U.S. legislators will have to decide which interests to protect: producers or 
consumers? It is not an easy task due to the political nature of sugar trade and powerful 
lobbying efforts from both sides. 
Model Limits and Suggestions for Future Research 
Although the GTAP model and GEMPACK are well documented and there are 
hundreds of studies using the GTAP and GEMPACK in their modeling, further 
improvements are necessary. There were several problems faced during the research. The 
GTAP database is very comprehensive, however the commodities and countries are not as 
disaggregated as would be desirable for some types of research. The biggest limitation of 
GTAP for this research is that HFCS is not disaggregated so it could not be directly modeled 
in this research. 
In the rapidly changing world trade, even the previous two to three year’s base data 
may not be suitable for the analysis. Another serious problem encountered during the research 
was the levels of shocks. In case the research demands large shocks, the GTAP and 
GEMPACK may not be able to handle those shocks properly. For example, if this research 
needed to analyze the impact of wider Mexican sugar access in the amount of 250,000 MT or 
900% shock in this case, it would have been difficult to simulate such high shocks.  
This research addressed a very important topic in U.S. agricultural trade policies. The 
results of this study and other authors confirm that such policies and trade disputes 
undoubtedly will have an impact on the economies of countries engaged in the dispute, as well 
as on their political relations. There definitely remains a need for further research, as the U.S.- 
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Mexico sugar dispute remains open and continues to grow, changing its scope and opening 
new conflicts, such as the disagreement over U.S. exports of HFCS products. There is a 
genuine opportunity to conduct future research determining the interaction of HFCS and the 
sugar industries in the U.S. and worldwide, and of their impact on producer and consumer 
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